15 julho 2003

ECO-TERROR
But Dreamers Built The World...: ‘Megaproject development is currently a field where little can be trusted’
[Bent Flyvbjerg, Nils Bruzelius and Werner Rothengatter] of Denmark, Sweden and Germany, respectively, have evidently tried to strike a raw nerve by subtitling their book, Megaprojects And Risk — An Autonomy Of Ambition. As development planners and transportation economists (who apparently also dabble in social psychology), the trio have not spared any punches in linking the failure of megaprojects to human greed. [...]
The three European professors provide a fascinating account of how promoters of multibillion dollar megaprojects systematically and self-servingly misinform Parliaments, the public and the media, to get projects approved and built.
They show how the formula for approval is an unhealthy cocktail of underestimated costs, overestimated revenues, undervalued environmental impacts and overvalued economic development effects. [...]
The situation is similar in both industrialised and industrialising countries—from Asia to Europe to the Americas. Witness the Channel tunnel in Europe, the Oresund bridge between Denmark and Sweden, the Vasco da Gama bridge in Portugal, Hong Kong’s Check Lap Kok airport in Asia, China’s Quinling tunnel, the Akashi Kaikyo bridge in Japan, Sydney’s harbour tunnel, Malaysia’s North-South Expressway and Thailand’s Second Stage Expressway. [...]
Yet, as the authors point out, when actual versus predicted performances of megaprojects are compared, the picture is often dismal. The authors have documented in this book that cost overruns of 50-100 per cent in real terms are common in megaprojects and more than 100 per cent overruns are not uncommon. Demand forecasts, they say, go wrong by 20-70 per cent. [...]
Megaproject development is currently a field where little can be trusted, not even numbers produced by analysts. The authors provide a peep-show into social psychology. Politicians have a “monument complex”, and also salivate at the prospect of huge kickbacks. Investment bankers love to cut megasize deals and wash their hands off them after collecting sizeable financial closure related “success fees”. Engineers like to build things and contractors just want the contract. If these interested stakeholders are involved in, or indirectly influence, the forecasting process, they may influence outcomes in ways that make it more likely for a project to be built. [...]
Finally, they propose that four basic instruments of accountability be employed in megaproject decision making: transparency, performance specifications, explicit formulation of regulatory regime and the involvement of risk capital. The book offers a wealth of empirical evidence, but there are aspects that the authors do not touch upon. Their book, for instance, is empirically far too Eurocentric. [...]
The authors attempt to grapple with the issue and, as expected, come to the sobering conclusion that all projects should be based on research, logic, risk analysis, etc. But then, the world has been built by dreamers.
Someone, somewhere said, “The reasonable man adapts to the world. The unreasonable man wants to change the world and make it adapt to his ideas. Therefore, all progress depends on the unreasonable man.” Do read this book to find out which side of the fence you are on.